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Abstract 
The extent, speed and impact of population ageing have often been exaggerated because 
standard indicators such as the Old-Age Dependency Ratio or Support Ratio do not take 
proper account of falling mortality, the changing relationship between age and employment, 
or (usually) both. Neither do such ratios consider the changing composition in terms of 
educational attainment, human capital or other population characteristics. Not surprisingly, 
over the last decade or so demographers have developed alternatives. This paper provides an 
overview of such alternatives and briefly discusses their utility. 
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1. Background 
Population ageing is the process whereby low fertility and decreasing mortality gives rise to 
changes in the age structure of the population within which older people form an ever 
increasing proportion of the total. It is considered to be of economic importance because of a 
fundamental feature of the economic life-cycle, namely that working-age adults produce 
more through their labour than they consume, contrary to elderly and children who they 
directly or indirectly sustain. This economic pattern is only possible because resources flow 
over time and across generations through a complex system of social, economic, and political 
institutions (Fürnkranz-Prskawetz et al. 2011). As a population’s age structure shifts from 
having a very young population to one that is dominated by people of working age (initially 
mainly through the reduction of fertility) this so-called first demographic dividend can be 
potentially beneficial for its living standards and economic growth. However, as more people 
survive to old age and older ages within old age, as is the case in all low mortality countries 
today, for every worker paying income tax and national insurance there are more older 
citizens who have a higher propensity to be disabled and ill than younger people, leading to 
greater demands on health and welfare systems. Given that population ageing is only 
projected to intensify during the coming decades, concern among policy makers has been 
raised (Burnside 2012; Doyle et al. 2009; Polder et al. 2002; The Select Committee on Public 
Service and Demographic Change 2013; Wolf & Amirkhanyan 2010). However, the extent, 
speed and impact of population ageing have often been exaggerated as standard measures of 
population ageing such as the Old Age Dependency Ratio (OADR) or its inverse, the Support 
Ratio (in its simplest form), are based solely on fixed chronological ages. This can be 
misleading because they implicitly assume that there will be no progress in important factors 
such as remaining life expectancies, disability rates (Lutz et al. 2008d) or changes in labour 
force participation (Spijker & MacInnes 2013b).  
Counting the dependent older population 
In an era of increasing life expectancy, especially at higher ages, a number of demographers 
have been advocating that age should be thought of in terms of years left until death or in 
proportion to expanding lifespan rather than a fixed chronological age boundary. Defining 
old age by using life expectancy instead of chronological age was first suggested by Ryder 
(1975) but over the last decade especially expanded upon by Sanderson and Scherbov (2005, 
2007b, a, 2010), Lutz et al. (2008c, d) as well as Baltes and Smith (2003). Measures that 
adjust for changes in longevity show a much slower pace of population ageing over the last 
half a century (and in some instances even in the opposite than the expected direction) than 
those based on the traditional definition of age.  
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Counting the working population  
Another point of criticism of the OADR is that it assumes that everyone of working age 
actually works despite the fact that the knowledge-based service economy keeps young 
people in education for longer and many older workers voluntarily, or otherwise, retire early 
(Spijker & MacInnes 2013b). On top of that, the unemployed also usually depend on the state 
for their welfare, while homemakers are one of the biggest groups of the non-working 
population. Conversely, greater sex equality and dual career families have added millions of 
women workers to the labour market over the past 50 years. These are all reasons why using 
age to define the working population makes little sense. Indeed, in all high income countries 
there are more people aged under 65 who are not economically active than people above that 
age (http://laborsta.ilo.org; own calculations). Given the economic and labour market 
fluctuations it would thus appear logical to include or correct for the population in paid 
employement in the denominator of elderly dependency ratios (EDRs)
1
: any increase in 
labour force participation (LFP) could potentially reduce per capita costs associated with a 
growing elderly population while high unemployment would do the opposite. Indeed, a 
complimentary approach to raising the normal pension age to support ageing populations is to 
raise the average LFP rate (Scherbov et al. 2014). 
Human capital 
As mentioned earlier, the prolongation of education beyond the usual minimum age of 16 is 
one factor why many young adults are not in employment. However, when higher educated 
persons do enter the workforce they quickly earn more money than lower educated workers 
of the same age. Therefore, as more human capital leads to higher productivity (as measured 
by GDP) this implies that fewer workers are necessary to provide the financial resources 
needed to care for the ‘dependent’ elderly. Countries where human capital increases rapidly 
can therefore be considered an important factor for alleviating the negative effects of 
population ageing by potentially offsetting declines in the number of people in paid 
employment. Yet, Philipov et al (2014) argue that higher human capital shaped by earlier 
schooling, training and work experience also has a downside for government expenditure, 
namely that human capital utilized during working lives is decisive for the level of income 
obtained during retirement, i.e. it tends to be higher for individuals who earned more during 
their working life. The authors therefore came up with an EDRs that takes this into 
consideration, as will be shown later. 
Changing age profiles of income, consumption and wealth 
While standard support and dependency ratios are widely used as indicators for measuring 
the effects of population ageing on economic development, both use fixed age limits to 
distinguish between the working and the dependent populations (Prskawetz & Sambt 2014). 
Unfortunately, the use of inflexible age categories (even if they are adjusted for changing life 
                                                 
1
 In the paper I use Elderly Dependency Ratio as a generic term which may refer to any type of ‘old age’ 
dependency ratio, including the conventional OADR. 
4 
 
expectancy) prevents taking into account the changing age profiles of consumption and 
income across time as a result of demographic shifts. In the past, these changes have been 
summarised in different types of economic support ratios. For instance, Cuttler (1990) did so 
by relating a weighted share of the working-age population in the numerator to the weighted 
sum of all consumers in the denominator. Taking only the retired people in the latter would of 
course yield an elderly support ratio. By considering the age profiles of consumption and 
income levels a new set of economic support ratios can be produced, indicators which would, 
assuming a continuation of the current country-specific social security systems and economic 
activities, provide better estimates of the consequences of demographic change for the 
reallocation of resources across ages. For instance, analyses have shown that population 
ageing can yield a second demographic dividend if younger generations reduce their 
consumption as a way to increase their wealth and achieve higher consumption in future 
periods (Prskawetz & Sambt 2014; Mason & Lee 2007).  
The following, and main, part of the paper provides an overview of studies that 
propose alternatives to the standard indicator of population ageing – the OADR – by taking 
into consideration one or more of the aforementioned aspects, i.e. changes in survival, the 
labour force/productivity, human capital or age-specific income and consumption
2
. The 
utility or limitations of each are also discussed. Table 5 at the end of the section provides an 
overview of the discussed ageing indicators and includes, if available, whether short-term 
projections or forecasts (until about 2020), generally predict an increase or decrease in the 
indicator
3
. 
 
2. Towards more Objective Elderly Dependency Ratios 
The level of past, current or future levels in population ageing depend much on how it is 
measured, but as there is no consensus as to what indicator is best to use it is not clear as to 
how aged our (or any) society really is. This is in part because the different driving forces 
behind population ageing in a society, i.e. a decline in fertility, mortality or net migration 
loss, affect specific ages more than other ages. If, for instance, a population ageing indicator 
considers the whole population in its calculations, as is the case with the Total Dependency 
Ratio (TDR), changing fertility levels will have a more immediate effect on the level of 
population ageing than if the non-adult population is excluded (as in for example the OADR). 
In case of the latter, there will not be an effect of declining fertility on the ratio until the 
smaller birth cohorts reach working age, which will then gradually slow down the growth rate 
of the work force. This is illustrated in Table 1 for Spain, a country that observed one of the 
                                                 
2
 As the OADR is a ratio, for comparison purposes the ageing indicators discussed in detail in the paper 
excludes those that are medians or averages like Sanderson and Scherbov’s (2007b) prospective median age (a 
life-expectancy adjusted median age that shows a much lower increase in median age over the last three decades 
than the standard median age). 
3
 Long-term projections are not provided because they do not exist in the literature for several indicators. 
Moreover in the case of the indicators developed by the author, too many assumptions would be required e.g. on 
future age-specific labour force participation rates, making them too speculative. 
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fastest declines in fertility during the late 1970s and 1980s. As a result, the TDR actually 
declined faster during the 1980s than the OADR increased. Conversely, the addition of about 
five million migrants to the Spanish population during the first decade of the 21
st
 century 
virtually neutralized the ageing of the population, while the abrupt halt of immigration (in 
fact there has been a net-outmigration of about half a million people, mainly of working age, 
since 2010) and a stabilized low fertility rate has led to an annual increase of 2.4 % in the 
OADR and of 1.8% in the TDR over the 2009-14 period. 
Table 1. Annual inter-period % decline in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), TDR and 
OADR, Spain, 1976-2014. 
 Observed Average annual change (%) 
Indicator 1979 1989 1999 2009 2014 1979-89 1989-99 1999-09 2009-14 
TFR 2.37 1.40 1.19 1.38 1.27 -5.3 -1.6 1.5 -2.0 
OADR 17.80 19.81 23.73 24.12 27.22 1.1 1.8 0.2 2.4 
TDR 60.35 51.68 45.69 45.65 50.01 -1.6 -1.2 0.0 1.8 
 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (www.ine.es). The ageing 
indicator that changes (positive or negative) relatively the most between two periods is highlighted in bold. 
 
Secondly, the level of population ageing also depends on how the old-age and 
working-age populations are defined. Traditionally, fixed age boundaries linked to the 
statutory pension age and the minimum school-leaving age are used to separate the old-age 
from the working-age population. With regard to the OADR, the most common of EDRs, 
which is obtained by dividing the elderly population by the population of working age, the 
elderly population is usually defined as those aged 65 or older (or sometimes 60+) and the 
working age population as 15-64, 16-64, 20-64, 20-59 or similar. One important reason 
population ageing measurements are based on static age boundaries is because of the age of 
eligibility that is set by public policy for social arrangements related to ageing, particularly 
public pension plans. The question that can be raised, however, is how useful such a 
definition really is. Lutz et al. (2008d) even labelled measures of population ageing based 
solely on fixed chronological ages as ‘misleading’ because they implicitly assume that there 
will be no progress in important factors such as remaining life expectancies and disability 
rates. 
2.1. Years Left vs. Years Lived 
Rather than a fixed age boundary it would be more appropriate to think of age in terms of 
years left until death or in proportion to the expanding lifespan (Sanderson & Scherbov 
2005). This concept of looking at years of life left rather than years lived is not new. Hersch 
(1944) introduced the concept of Potential Years of Life (PYL). The idea was quite simple. 
The “average” person of a given age 𝑥 still has a potential number of years of life ahead, 
equalling the average remaining life expectation (𝑒𝑥) of members of a population. As Panush 
and Peritz (1996) noted, this measure has some useful applications, including the calculation 
of the number of potential years in the labour force or retirement. Since then, others have 
made modifications based on Hersch’s idea of potential life years, including Sanderson and 
Scherbov (2005, 2007b, 2008) and Lutz et al. (2008c) who introduced the concept of 
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prospective age (initially called standardised age). This is the age of a person in the standard 
life table who has the same remaining life expectancy as the person of interest
4
. For instance, 
an Austrian male aged 50 today has the same life expectancy (30 years) as a likewise person 
aged 41 in 1950 (www.mortality.org). Given their identical life expectancy, one could argue 
that 41 is the new 50 if 1950 is used as the standard. If applied to a population’s median age, 
one obtains the so called prospective median age or PMA (Lutz et al. 2008c). The same 
authors also came up with an alternative for the average age of a population, i.e., an 
‘adjusted’ average age that takes age-specific life expectancies into consideration, the 
Population Average Remaining Years of Life expectancies (PARYL). Here the age-specific 
remaining life expectancies are weighted by the proportions of the population at each age 
whose average is then taken to obtain the average remaining years of life of population 
members. PARYL goes down as population ages. 
Another contribution, which anticipated the concept of prospective age, can be found in 
Ryder (1975, p.16; cited in Sanderson & Scherbov 2013) who wrote that: 
“To the extent that our concern with age is what it signifies about the degree of 
deterioration and dependence, it would seem sensible to consider the measurement of age 
not in terms of years elapsed since birth but rather in terms of the number of years 
remaining until death… 
We propose that some arbitrary length of time, such as 10 years, be selected and that we 
determine at what age the expectation of life is 10 years, that age to be considered the 
point of entry into old age”. 
Siegel and Davidson (1984) were the first to apply Ryder’s proposal with actual data, 
while others came (sometimes independently) to similar ideas (see Sanderson & Scherbov 
2013 for an overview). One of such alternative approaches to the conventional way of 
measuring the proportion of the population considered elderly, usually 60+ or 65+, was by 
Lutz et al. (2008c) who did not make it depend on a fixed age boundary but, rather, on a fixed 
remaining life expectancy, i.e.: 
 Proportion of the population in age groups that have a remaining life expectancy 
(RLE) of 15 years or less (Prop. RLE15-). Again, the life table is used to derive the age 
at which RLE equals 15. As the age at which RLE15- tends to fall between two completed 
years of age, linear interpolation is applied to obtain the exact age. Subsequently, using 
population data by single age and sex the total population equal to and above this age is 
obtained (also through interpolation) and divided by the total population to arrive at the 
proportion. If longevity increases, the minimum age of people included in Prop. RLE 15- 
increases; “but if the proportion of the total population above the age with an expectancy 
of 10 [or 15] years falls than this might [also] result from a rapid rise in life expectancy 
rather than [only due to] the actual ageing of the population” (Siegel & Davidson 1984; 
brackets added by author).  
                                                 
4
 See the Annex for how prospective age is calculated. 
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Although PMA and PARYL could be considered indicators of population ageing, they are of 
little policy value because they concern, respectively, the expected years to live of a middle-
aged person and of the whole population. 
Sanderson and Scherbov (2010) and others (Lutz et al. 2008c; Lutz 2009; Ryder 
1975) considered the age at which RLE equals 15 years as the threshold of elderly 
dependency (with the population equal to or above this threshold considered old age) rather 
than age 65 because it takes into account falling old-age mortality. If we obtain the 
population total for the numerator for each sex 𝑠 separately5 as men and women have 
disparate life expectancies (even at higher ages) Prop. RLE15- is calculated as: 
Prop. RLE15- = 
∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 100 (1) 
The fact that this age has been rising in most low-mortality countries since half-way 
last century (a bit earlier for women, a bit later for men) render these elderly ‘younger’, 
healthier and fitter than their peers in earlier cohorts.  
Likewise, while the OADR defines all people above the statutory pension age as 
‘dependent’, regardless of their economic, social or medical circumstances, it overlooks the 
fact that many elderly have accumulated substantial assets, may still be working and many 
have valuable experience or expert knowledge, while others do volunteer work vital to the 
‘third sector’ or look after grandchildren. Sanderson and Scherbov (2007b) thus came up with 
an alternative to the OADR: 
 Prospective Old Age Dependency Ratio (POADR). Here the population with RLE15-6 
is divided by the population below this age threshold but is at least 20 years old
7
. The age 
range of the working age population is thus slightly shifted upwards to exclude a large 
student population most of whom are not (fully) active in the workforce, but include 
young-old people who could potentially work when the age at old-age threshold is higher 
than 65 (in most high income countries since around the 1980s): 
POADR = 
∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ ∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
∗ 100 (2) 
When comparing the POADR with the standard OADR we can observe that once the 
age threshold at which RLE is 15 years or less is above 65, the ratio becomes higher than the 
OADR (if we use 20 as the lower boundary of working age in both indicators) as the size of 
the numerator is reduced and that of the denominator enlarged (Figure 1), but that over the 
next decades dependency as measured by the POADR is expected to decrease much less in 
                                                 
5
 This slight adjustment was first proposed in Spijker & MacInnes 2013b). 
6
 There are also other possible types of prospective old age dependency ratios. For instance, one can take a 
prospective age, an index year (year of interest) and a standard year and by varying the prospective age and the 
standard year, one can compute POADRs for different comparative purposes. One example is to assume that 
remaining life expectancy is kept constant at its observed value for 65 year olds in 2000 as a way to compare 
with the conventional OADR that divides the 65+ by the working-age population. The POADR is then the ratio 
of the number of people at equal to or older than the age threshold (i.e. prospective age 65+) to the number of 
people between 20 and that prospective age (Sanderson & Scherbov 2007b).  
7
 Rather than 15 or 16 as many older teenagers and young adults still attend secondary or higher education, 
meaning that most are not yet (fully) active in the workforce. 
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most countries of the world and in the case of the least developing countries, not at all (Table 
2 and Sanderson & Scherbov 2008). 
 
Figure 1. The OADR, POADR and age at which remaining life expectancy (RLE) equals 
15 years. US. 1950-2010. 
 
Source: Human Mortality Database (www.mmortality.org) 
 
Table 2. Conventional and prospective measures of population ageing for major world 
regions, 2005 and 2045 
 
Prop. 65+ 
(x100) 
Prop. RLE15-
x100 
Prop. 65+ 
(x100) 
Prop. RLE15-
x100 
POADR 
  2005 2045 2005 2045 2005 2045 2005 2045 2005 2045 
WORLD 7.4 15.2 7.4 15.2 66.3 69.8 66.3 69.8 11.9 17.7 
More developed regions  15.3 25.3 15.3 25.3 68.7 72.8 68.7 72.8 18.2 25.7 
Less developed regions
 a
 5.9 15.6 5.9 15.6 65.0 69.2 65.0 69.2 10.7 18.6 
Least developed countries 3.2 5.8 3.2 5.8 61.9 65.6 61.9 65.6 10.0 10.1 
a 
Excluding least developed countries 
Source: Sanderson & Scherbov 2008 
 
Even though using RLE15- is an improvement to using a fixed age like 60+ or 65+, 
the age at which RLE equals 15 years is also arbitrary (e.g. why not 2, 5 or 10 years?). 
Moreover, the literature tells us that especially health care expenses occur during the last 
year(s) of life, with little impact from the age at which these deaths occur (Miller 2001; 
Sanderson & Scherbov 2010; Seshamani & Gray 2004; Wong et al. 2011; Zweifel et al. 
1999). This perspective of remaining-years has also been applied in the fields of psychology 
and economics (Bíró 2010; Carstensen 2006; Carstensen et al. 1999; Cocco & Gomes 2012; 
Hamermesh 1985; Van Solinge & Henkens 2010) as such information is essential to good 
predictions of likely health, social care, pension, housing and other age-related expenditures. 
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In Riffe et al (2014), building on Brouard (1986), population age structures were therefore 
presented in terms of remaining years of life rather than chronological age
8
. This is an even 
clearer way to show that in times of falling mortality, chronological age becomes an 
unreliable and insufficient metric of ageing. The reason is because declines in mortality not 
only change the distribution of age within a population, it also shifts the distribution of 
remaining lifetimes at each age of that population and attenuates the effect of fertility on 
population ageing. The authors illustrated this by estimating the remaining lifespans of the 78 
million US babyboomers alive in 2011, i.e. at a time when the oldest of this cohort reached 
the retirement age. Results showed that the dreaded mortality burden of the US boomers is in 
fact expected to be dampened and stretched over a wider range of years
9
 than were the boom-
like onsets of other life transitions experienced earlier by this cohort (e.g. when many of this 
cohort had children they caused the so-called echo-boom). 
While the importance of considering both time already lived as time left to live of the 
members of a population is propagated in both Sanderson and Scherbov (2007b) and Riffe et 
al (2014), the former uses remaining life expectancy (RLE) that equates to a population 
average at a particular age while the latter considers remaining years of life (also labelled as 
Time-to-Death – TTD) at any age. So while adjusting for changes in life expectancy in 
determining the old-age threshold ─as the indicator RLE15- does─, is better than using a 
fixed age such as 65, it could still be criticized for including many elderly who consider 
themselves healthy. Moreover, it remains a population average measurement as many 
persons in the corresponding age group may still live another 30 years, while others will die 
within a few years. Depending on the purpose of the population ageing indicator, using 
RLE15- may not always be appropriate, such as with regard to elderly health care needs and 
expenditure given that the literature clearly shows that TTD is a better indicator for health 
care expenditure than age (Miller 2001). On the other hand, RLE15- does provide a way to 
define the general elderly population in an era of ever improving old-age survival. Therefore, 
in Spijker et al (2014) it was proposed to combine time to death (TTD) of up to 5 years with 
Sanderson and Scherbov’s RLE15-10 to create an indicator of acute health needs among the 
elderly population. Using the same denominator as Sanderson and Scherbov we calculate the 
following: 
POADR5TTD =
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15− & 𝑇𝑇𝐷<5
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ ∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
∗ 100  (3) 
Results for the US showed that the burden has been stable since 1980 at under three 
elderly with acute health needs for every adults of working age (according to the Sanderson 
and Scherbov definition), a rate which is not expected to rise above three until 2028 (Figure 
2). Again this suggests that population ageing is not fuelling the demand for health care 
                                                 
8
 See both publications for the method employed to decompose and restructure a population by remaining years 
of life based on information contained in the period life table. 
9
 For instance, if we assume that mortality rates starts declining by 2% per year at each age for this cohort but 
tapers off to constant mortality by around 2075 according to a logistic pattern, 50% of boomer deaths will fall 
between 2032 and 2049 and 10% will still be alive after 2058. 
10
 Fuchs (1984) had first proposed to combine it with the population aged 65+. 
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services but other factors such as progress in medical knowledge and technology, costs of 
hospitalization and the increasing use of long-term care facilities. 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of the population aged 65+, with a remaining life expectancy of 15 
years or less (RLE15-) and with both RLE15- and a time to death (TTD) of less than 5 
years, US, 1950-2050. 
 
Data source: Sex-specific population and mortality data until 2011 come from the Human Mortality Database 
(www.mortality.org) and the projected data from the US Census Bureau (www.census.gov). 
 
2.2. Non-Working to Working Population Ratios 
Key drivers of economic growth include labour supply, productivity, consumption and 
savings. These tend to vary depending on the position of people in the life cycle (Bloom et al. 
2010). Labour supply and productivity and their relationship to population ageing is 
discussed, while consumption and savings is treated in subsection 2.6. 
Changes in population age structure exert a significant influence on economic growth 
(Bloom et al. 2010). For instance, on the one hand, declining infant and child mortality 
followed by lower fertility and larger cohorts entering working age results in the first 
demographic dividend as the labour force grows faster than the (still relatively small) older 
and younger population who depend on it. Even if nothing else changes, per capita income 
will increase, but investments in the development of human capital, technological progress, 
institutions and governance, can boost economic productivity enormously. For instance, it has 
been suggested that these factors in combination with the demographic dividend were behind 
the economic miracle of East Asia between 1965 and 1990 (Bloom & Canning 2008; Bloom 
et al. 2010). Conversely, one concern regarding the consequences of population ageing is that 
there will be a rising number of older dependent citizens for every productive worker in 
employment. However, the size of the employed workforce is driven by many factors other 
than age as its relationship to the population age structure is rather dynamic, as was detailed 
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by Spijker and MacInnes (2013a): The employment rate of women and especially mothers 
increased dramatically over the last 50 years as systematic gender discrimination was 
dismantled at school and in the workplace and the ‘male breadwinner’ employment system 
weakened. While the ratio of productive workers to dependent citizens was moved upwards 
by the reduction in the number of young people in the population as fertility declined after the 
baby boom, it was also driven down by the shortening of careers due to the increase in the 
labour force level of educational attainment. Moreover, in many western countries less than 
one half wait until the state retirement age to leave the labour market, either because they can 
afford to do so or have been made redundant and no longer see any realistic prospect of 
obtaining employment (ibid. pp. 66-67). On top of that, a substantial proportion of the 
population of working age does not participate in the workforce, such as students and 
homemakers, or they do but are unemployed. As the aforementioned factors also fluctuate 
strongly as a result of economic booms and busts and changes in pension eligibility, the 
working-age population has become a flawed indicator of the population that is supposed to 
support the elderly. The same applies to the numerator of the conventional OADR as in high-
income countries the number of pensioners exceeds the population aged 65 and older (i.e. the 
pensioner ratio is greater than one) as public pensions are available at younger ages, either 
because the statutory retirement age is less than 65 (as e.g. in France and Japan) or it becomes 
available at a reduced rate at younger ages (Bongaarts 2004). Conversely, in other settings 
there are fewer people retired than there are people aged 65 or more, especially in settings 
where there is no or a negligible system of state-financed retirement pensions, forcing many 
elderly to remain active in the workforce, as is the case in most low-income and even many 
middle-income countries. For instance, in China there are large rural-urban differences in 
pension levels and the unemployed and self-employed are still not even covered (Wu 2013), 
while in Latin America pension coverage was 60% or less among the 65+ population in 
thirteen countries (Rofman & Oliveri 2012). 
For these reason, alternative indicators of the demographic burden of supporting the 
elderly have been constructed over the last decade or so. For instance, according to Bongaarts 
(2004) a more accurate indicator of the demographic burden of supporting the elderly
11
 is the 
ratio of pensioners to workers: 
PWR = 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 (4) 
This ratio is much larger than the conventional OADR in high income countries and 
particularly in France and Italy
12
. 
More akin to the TDR, Vaupel and Loichinger (2006) simply considered the ratio of 
non-workers to workers irrespective of their age
13
: 
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 Only indicators based on demographic and employment data and not to the actual cost of public retirement 
pensions such as Bongaarts’ (2004) public pension expenditure ratio are treated here.  
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 As illustrated by Bongaarts (2004) the PWR and the OADR are related, namely PWR= OADR x PR/ER, 
where PR is the pensioner ratio (the population aged 65 and older plus anyone under age 65 who is retired and 
over the minimum age of eligibility for a public pension) and ER the employment ratio (proportion of the 
population aged 15-64 that is employed).  
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𝑅 =
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠
# 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 1+ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑎 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘
 (5) 
The authors argued for a better redistribution of work across all adult ages of life so 
individuals could combine work with education, leisure and childrearing as currently work is 
concentrated in the ages of life relevant for child-bearing and child rearing. Then, around the 
age of 60, people retire with decades left to live, which are paid for by younger working 
adults, many of whom are also taking care of children. 
The 20th century also saw the rise of the eight-hour working day and five-day 
working week and a substantial reduction in the number of working days per year (through 
increased holiday entitlement), meaning that per capita yearly hours worked dropped by half 
(The Conference Board 2011; own calculation). One way to be more precise in capturing the 
impact of population ageing on the labour force size is to estimate full-time equivalent 
workers as the numerator. This is what Tyers and Shi (2007) did who constructed a ‘Non-
Working-aged’ Dependency Ratio, which is the number of non-working persons over 60 per 
full-time equivalent worker, i.e.: 
𝑁𝑊𝐷𝑅 =  
𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 60+
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠
 (6) 
 
2.3. Years Left-Based Elderly Dependency Ratios with Alternative Denominators 
In Spijker and MacInnes (2013b) it was also argued that only those in paid employment 
rather than everyone of ‘working age’ (however defined) should be considered as the 
population who is supposed to pay for elderly health and wellbeing. However, the authors 
then took Sanderson and Scherbov’s (2007b) methodology for the numerator, i.e. by 
adjusting the age-threshold of the population considered ‘old’ for changing life expectancy at 
older ages, to obtain the so-called Real Elderly Dependency Ratio (REDR):  
REDR = 
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100 (7) 
In the example shown for the US in Figure 3, over the last 3-4 decades there was a 
decline in the population ageing burden, a trend which is expected to continue until the end of 
this decade after which the REDR is likely to increase, but slower than the POADR if we 
apply a 1% increase in LFP rates to ages 16-64 to attain rates similar to the recorded 
maximum for men in the year 2000 and well as for ages 65-69, 70-74 and 75+ in the 
anticipation of better health and incentives to work beyond retirement age.  
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 This ratio is one of two, what the authors called, ‘Rostock indicators’ of Demographic Change. Their second 
indicator, abbreviated as H, equals the number of hours worked per week per capita. 
13 
 
Figure 3. POADR vs. REDR, including adjustments for changing LFP rates. US. 1950-
2010. 
 
Data source: Sex-specific population and mortality data until 2011 come from the Human Mortality Database 
(www.mortality.org), the projected data from the US Census Bureau (www.census.gov) and the sex-specific 
employment data till 2013 form the Labour Force Statistics (www.bls.gov). 
 
While the contribution of the REDR indicator in the discussion on alternatives to the 
OADR was to only consider people in paid employment instead of everyone of working age 
in the denominator, it considers everyone in paid employment as equally productive despite 
large time and country differences in terms of, for instance, hours worked. A potentially 
useful ratio would be therefore to divide the elderly population, defined as those in ages with 
RLE15-, by GDP, as recently illustrated in Spijker et al. (2014), i.e.  
𝑅𝐿𝐸15/𝑔𝑑𝑝 =
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝐾 $
∗ 1,000,000   (8) 
As a note, from a government policy perspective it makes no sense to use per capita GDP as 
we are interested in the total economic output, irrespective of the number of workers. If one 
wishes to analyse different countries at the same time it is best to use internationally 
comparative data on GDP such as the 1990 US$ converted at Geary Khamis (GK) Purchasing 
Power Parities that can be obtained from The Conference Board (2014) Total Economy 
Database. To avoid very small numbers the ratio was multiplied by one million.  
As the results showed in Spijker et al. (2014), again for the US, costs per elderly declined 
slowly but steadily between 1970 and around 2005, have been stable since then, and are 
expected to remain stable over the coming decades. As any government expenditure on the 
elderly has to come from taxes, we constructed a similar indicator to the previous one by 
dividing by government tax revenue: 
𝑅𝐿𝐸15/𝑡𝑎𝑥 =
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−
𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝐾 $
∗ 1,000,000   (9) 
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Here results showed that in the US the number of elderly per 1 million tax dollars declined 
from about 25 in the early 1970s to between 10 and 13 during the 2000s. Projecting this for 
the next 15 years the elderly/tax revenue ratio would be stable at around 10 elderly per 1 
million tax dollars. 
 
2.4. Old Age vs. Ill-Health 
Another alternative used in population ageing indicators is not to consider life expectancy or 
TTD but disability (Sanderson & Scherbov 2010). In a context of increasing proportions of 
elderly in high income/low mortality countries over the next decades, improvements in the 
functional status of elderly people could help mitigate the rise in the demand for, and hence 
expenditure on, long-term care. Lafortune and Balestat (2007) therefore analysed the trends 
in severe disability among the population aged 65 and over in 12 OECD countries. The 
authors defined severe disability as having one or more limitations in basic activities of daily 
living (ADLs)
14
 and considered it as an indicator of dependency because severe limitations 
tend to be closely related to demands for long-term care. They only found clear evidence of a 
decline in age-standardised and non-age-standardised disability rates among elderly people in 
five of the countries studied (Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States). 
Even in those countries, it was not expected that the declining trend would completely offset 
the rising demand for long-term care as a result of further population ageing that leads to 
increasing numbers of people at older ages with a severe disability. However, the authors did 
not contemplate comparing the trend in severe disability with, for instance, that of the 
employed population who indirectly finances the public health care of the elderly through 
taxation. This would have led to a ‘severe’ disability support ratio. 
Manton et al. (2006) used a less stringent definition of disability
15
 to estimate the 
(change in the) proportion of active (i.e. disability-free) life expectancy (ALE) out of the total 
life expectancy (LE) at ages 65 and 85 between 1935 and 2080 in the US
16
: 
ALE/LE ratio = 
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑥
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑥
∗ 100 (10) 
Results showed that until the early 1980s total LE at age 65 grew faster or at the same 
pace as ALE, but since then (and at age 85 and older throughout the whole period) there has 
been an accelerated decline in disability, a trend that is expected to continue over the course 
of this century. This information was used by the authors to assess the long-term stability of 
the social security long-term liability. For instance, the growth in the latter could be slowed 
down by taking advantage of the increase in ALE by increasing the normal retirement age to 
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 Such as eating, washing/bathing, dressing, and getting in and out of bed. 
15
 Any health-related difficulty performing at least one instrumental activity of daily living (IADL) of activity of 
daily living (ADL) for 90 or more consecutive days, or currently residing in an institution providing medical 
services. 
16
 The authors used the Sullivan method of ALE estimation based on period life tables and survey-based period-
specific estimates of disability prevalence (Sullivan 1971). 
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72 years by 2022 as this would give the same number of years of Social Security Old-Age 
Benefit (SSA) to the non-disabled retiree as in 1935 (SSA inception).  
The application of disability-adjusted ageing measures to a large number of countries 
was first performed by Sanderson and Scherbov (2010) when they constructed the Adult 
Disability Dependency Ratio (ADDR)
17
.  
ADDR = 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
∗ 100 (11) 
This indicator was devised to measure the change in adult disability, whereby results 
show that the ADDR increase less rapidly than the OADR as well as the POADR. Although 
such information is useful for policymaking in health care, unlike the ALE/LE ratio this ratio 
is not strictly an EDR as the population in either side of the division line concerns the entire 
adult population. However, one could argue of course that people with a disability have an 
older age profile than those who do not. 
Muszyńska and Rau (2012), on the other hand, proposed a health-state-specific 
(additive) decomposition of the OADR into an old-age healthy dependency ratio and an old-
age unhealthy dependency ratio. These indicators could be seen as alternatives to the OADR 
that merely represents the weight of old people in relation to the population of working age 
irrespective of the health condition of those on either side of the equation. Indeed, the fact 
that poor health is the most important determinant of exit from paid employment in Europe 
while there is potential growth in the number of the elderly who are still in good health raises 
the question of whether potential improvements in health and disability could compensate for 
the ageing process on the labour supply side of the market. The authors’ new indicators thus 
distinguish between a) the weight of those who are in good health and could potentially 
remain in the labour force; and b) those who are disabled or have chronic conditions, and are 
therefore less likely to work, and are more likely to require financial and other support, i.e.:  
𝐻𝑂𝐷𝑅 =
𝑁𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦,65+
𝑁15−64
 (12) 
𝑈𝑛𝐻𝑂𝐷𝑅 =
𝑁𝑈𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦,65+
𝑁15−64
 (13) 
The sum of the two partial dependency ratios equals the OADR, i.e. 
𝑁𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦,65+
𝑁15−64
+
𝑁𝑈𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦,65+
𝑁15−64
=
𝑁65+
𝑁15−64
= 𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑅 
Using data from SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe – see 
www.share-project.org) the authors subsequently projected future disability rates for 13 
European countries based on the following assumptions: a) that fertility and mortality levels 
will converge across countries by the year 2150; b) that morbidity will compress
18
, i.e. that 
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 With disability the authors referred to the proportion of people who responded in the EU-SILC survey that 
there were “strongly limited”. 
18
 The two other common scenarios of morbidity, the expansion of morbidity or the dynamic equilibrium were 
discarded by the authors because even under the more optimistic assumption, i.e. morbidity compression, it is 
generally expected that even the anticipated improvements in health and disability would not compensate for the 
ageing process on the labour supply (Muszyńska & Rau 2012). 
16 
 
the proportion of life spent in poor health will be smaller, but in contrast to Fries (1989), not 
by assuming fewer years of poor health and constant life expectancy but that unhealthy life 
expectancy does not change combined with increasing life expectancy at age 65; and that the 
age pattern of activity limitations will not change over the projection period. 
Results showed that the growth in the number of elderly people in Europe is expected 
to cause a rise in both healthy and unhealthy dependency ratios but in which the healthy 
dependency ratio is projected to make up a larger part of the OADR (50% in 2030 compared 
to 57% in 2006) due to the anticipated future improvements in population health and positive 
migration balance
19
. While from a policy perspective, especially with regard to future health 
care costs, it makes sense to split the elderly up into those who are considered healthy and 
those who are not, the authors used a fixed age threshold linked to retirement age to separate 
the working age (15-64) from the retired (65+), yet they acknowledge in discussion that many 
retire early (some, though not all, for health reasons). Neither did the authors adjust for 
proposed and implemented increasing pension ages in the respective European countries. So 
why not just perform the analysis on the retired population instead of using, what is 
increasingly becoming an arbitrary age, i.e. 65+? Using the working age population, defined 
as anyone aged 15-64, as population who is supposed to finance the wellbeing of the elderly 
is also flawed. Firstly, using age 15 as the lower working age limit is no longer applicable, 
not only because education is compulsory until at least age 16 in all of the studied countries 
but many students continue several years beyond that to complete upper-secondary and 
tertiary qualifications. Secondly, and yet more significant, only about 66% of people in 
working age in the EU28 are actually in paid employment, whereby the rate for women at 
each age group is less than that of men and in most countries even less than half of men who 
are close to retirement age still do work. Neither does their second assumption regarding their 
optimistic scenario seem realistic, i.e. assuming that only those with activity limitations at 
older ages will be out of the labour market. How many healthy 80+ would really want to 
continue to work? My suggestion would be to use those in paid employment as the 
denominator irrespective of age akin to the REDR indicator (formula 7) and make some 
simple assumptions as to future age-specific LFP rates based on current changes in pension 
systems. When considering the adult population as a whole as in the ADDR (formula 11), an 
alternative disability dependency ratio would be: 
𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑅 =
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100 (14) 
If we are instead only interested in elderly (whose age range corresponds to RLE15-) the 
formula equals: 
𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑅 =
∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100 (15) 
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 More precisely, compared to an OADR of 25 in 2006 in the 13 European countries where 11 elderly per 100 
people of working age (15–64) were healthy and 14 unhealthy, the authors estimated that in 2030 the OADR 
would increase to 40 with exactly half of them in poor health and half in good health (Tables 1 and 3 in 
Muszyńska & Rau 2012). 
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In the event of a lack of internationally- or time-comparable data on disability, an 
alternative estimate of potential health care needs and expenditure is to use TTD of up to 5 
years (i.e. using mortality rather than morbidity data as shown earlier in section 2.1). If we 
are then again interested in elderly, the dependent population equals that of POADR5TTD 
(formula 3), i.e.: 
𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑅5𝑇𝑇𝐷 =
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15− & 𝑇𝑇𝐷<5
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100  (16) 
This indicator ―named the Health care need adjusted Real Elderly Dependency Ratio― 
was proposed in Spijker et al. (2014) where results for the US showed that like Prop RLE15-
&TTD the health care burden has been very stable since around 1980 and will only slowly 
start to increase in a few years’ time. 
 
2.5. Human Capital 
In order to alleviate the burden of increasing numbers of elderly in a population more 
productivity (as measured by GDP) is required. Up until now, some of the alternative 
dependency ratios took the actual working population into consideration in the denominator 
rather than the population of working age (formulas 4, 5, 7, 14-16) or the amount of hours 
worked (formula 6). Formula 8 did not consider the employed population at all but just took 
GDP, as from a government policy perspective total economic output is more relevant than 
the number of workers. On similar lines, as government expenditure is only possible through 
taxes, government tax revenue was used as the denominator in formula 9. 
However, while productivity can be increased by getting more people to work, it can 
also be obtained through investing in human capital. Human capital not only improves the 
productivity of the labour force, it also stimulates long-term economic growth and can 
therefore facilitate the allocation of the resources required for the retired population (Kemnitz 
& Wigger 2000). One way society can invest in human capital is through education
20
; but 
while the prolongation of education beyond the current usual minimum age of 16 years has 
resulted in few young adults participating in the labour force, when higher educated persons 
do enter the workforce they quickly earn more money than lower educated workers of the 
same age. Hence, as more human capital leads to higher productivity, fewer workers are 
necessary to provide the financial resources that help to care for the ‘dependent’ elderly. In 
addition, it can alleviate some of the negative effects of population ageing as the most 
educated tend to work longer and retire at later ages and can therefore at least partially offset 
the shrinking working-age population (Lutz et al. 2008a; 2008b). 
Yet, as Philipov et al (2014) argue, higher human capital also has a downside for 
government expenditure. This is because human capital that is utilized during working lives 
is decisive for the level of income obtained during retirement, i.e. it tends to be higher for 
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 Other ways include training and healthcare (Becker 2009) and, in the context of economic production, once 
employed further human capital is accumulated through experience. 
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individuals who earned more during their working life. They therefore constructed an EDR 
that takes into account the increasing human capital in both the working and retired-age 
population. Specifically, and building on Striessnig and Lutz (2014) who applied education-
weighted dependency ratios with the purpose to determine the optimal fertility needed to 
achieve the lowest total dependency ratio, the authors weighted the working-age population 
by earning functions and the elderly population by human-capital-specific public pension 
levels. To arrive at their dependency ratio, in the first step the authors projected the age, sex 
and education composition of the population, whereby each individual contributed exactly 
one unit to the overall distribution. Subsequently, they differentiated the units according to 
the achieved level of human capital, applying education- and sex-specific earning functions 
to the working-age population (ages 20-64). Under the assumption that labour income is 
positively correlated with schooling and work experience, this was done by linking each level 
of education with an average number of years spent in school; and linking work experience 
with age: the higher the age, the longer the work experience. However, as according to the 
authors human capital accumulation could decline at the end of working life, the (full-time 
gross) income function levels off towards old working ages or takes the form of an inverse U-
shape: 
𝑌 = 𝛼. 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽1. 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2.𝐴𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀, 
The resulting income functions were then used to construct a population aged 20-64 
that is adjusted for its human-capital and age-specific composition. This was one by pivoting 
all values to the lowest income, which was that of a female aged 20 having a low education. 
If she contributed 1 unit to the age composition, a man aged 50 contributed 2.2, 2.87 or 4.72 
units if his level of education was low, middle or high, respectively. 
The human-capital composition of the population aged 65 and above was constructed 
differently as Philipov et al (2014) assumed that this population is retired, so the retired 
human capital was examined. To this end, they made use of the median of education-specific 
gross public pensions over the whole age span 65 and above. The person-units assigned to a 
person aged 65 or older with a specific sex and education were once more related to the 
income of a female aged 20 having an education equal to or lower than secondary level. The 
resulting ratio they called the human capital-specific OADR or HC-OADR: 
HC-OADR = 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 65+ 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20−64 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
 (17) 
Based on the results the authors concluded that while education has a positive impact on 
an economy’s productivity, in the long run a constant or moderately growing human capital 
may actually aggravate the consequences of population ageing rather than alleviate them as a 
better educated labour force will have higher pensions once it has retired because they 
contributed more during their working life. The authors therefore advocated integrating 
human capital into the calculation of the conventional population age composition and 
dependency ratio as an increase in education accelerates population ageing. However, while 
their robustness checks (e.g. excluding the unemployed, different fixed or increasing ages at 
retirement) did not alter the results, the authors did not contemplate adjusting the 
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denominator for employment (e.g. by taking full-time equivalent workers), as participation 
rates continuously change in the wake of economic booms and busts. Likewise, as 
educational expansion has led to an increase in female LFP and participation rates of the 
young-old have begun to increase over the last decades, there are likely to be proportionally 
more older workers in future. The authors’ rationale for deriving their income functions for 
full-time employment but assigning them to the entire working-age population rather than 
only the employed was because such estimates present the full productive capacity of 
employment and health/disability status. However, this raises the question as to how 
applicable or useful their indicator really is, especially for international and time comparison, 
given that such an assumption does not reflect reality. For instance, the proportion of the 
working-age population in western countries that does not work fluctuates between about 
20% (Japan 2012) and 55% (Spain 1985) (www.oecd.org). Moreover, educational attainment 
is not a guarantee for employment as has been evident in Spain for decades. Youth 
unemployment in 2014 was still above 50% while the proportion of 20-34 year olds with 
tertiary educational attainment in 2013 was well above the EU28 average 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database).  
2.6. Capturing Changes in Age-Specific Production, Consumption and Wealth 
Proponents of the doom scenario that population ageing will bring a decline or stagnation in 
future economic productivity tend to forget that the ratio of productive workers to dependent 
citizens has been driven down, particularly over the last half a century or so, by the 
shortening of workers’ labour market careers due to the need for a higher educated labour 
force and, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, through early retirement schemes (Spijker 
& MacInnes 2013a). Although baby boomers did of course dominate the workforce, and were 
an important factor in the first demographic dividend, as explained in more detail below, the 
economy also grew in western countries because it became orientated towards more 
productive industries and high-value services. Less well known (at least for non-economists), 
however, is that economic growth is also driven by consumption and savings, that together 
with aggregate labour supply and productivity, tend to vary depending on where most people 
fall in the life cycle.  
Not surprisingly, labour supply is higher among working-age adults than among the 
young and old. Conversely, the ratio of consumption to production tends to be greater than 1 
for the economically dependent youth and elderly and less than 1 for the working age as the 
overwhelming majority of the former are not in paid employment while money is spent on, 
respectively, education and healthcare (Figure 4). As a consequence, and other things equal, a 
country with large age-groups of youth and elderly is likely to experience slower growth than 
one with a high proportion of working-age people (Coale & Hoover 1958). At the same time, 
as the older population becomes larger and politically stronger, adopting certain policies such 
as cutting health and pension benefits will prove difficult. This worries policymakers and 
economists who argue that without reforms the sustainability of public pensions and health 
care is threatened. However, if policymakers initiate action early, a country will be better able 
to deal with the social, economic, and political effects of an impending altered population 
structure. A good moment would be during the intermediate phase of the demographic 
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transition when population ageing is barely noticeable and the first demographic dividend is 
being materialised as the working-age population outgrows the number of consumers and 
income per effective consumer grows faster than productivity (Bloom et al. 2010).  
Under these circumstances population ageing can actually have potentially positive 
economic outcomes in the form of a so-called second demographic dividend, i.e. that 
consumption outgrows the growth in the economic support ratio. But as with the first 
demographic dividend, capturing this potential depends on whether consumers and policy 
makers are forward-looking and respond effectively to the demographic changes that are 
coming, as reflected by the quality of governmental institutions, labour legislation, 
macroeconomic management, openness to trade, and education policy (Mason & Lee 2006; 
Bloom & Canning 2008)
21
. Some of the additional resources that are freed during the first 
demographic dividend can be used to increase consumption, raising current standards of 
living, and some can be invested in human or physical capital or in stronger institutions that 
will lead to permanently higher economic growth. 
 
Figure 4. Consumption and labour income age profiles for the United States, 2003. 
 
 
Source: National Transfer Accounts project (www.ntaccounts.org). 
 
In a sense, the two dividends are opposite sides of the same coin. The first dividend 
arises because parents of working-age have fewer (dependent) children and the second 
dividend because one generation later, the older, mostly retired, parents will have fewer 
working-age children. The share of elderly in the total population therefore increases, 
exacerbated by improved old-age survival chances. Importantly, however, is that while the 
second dividend is a consequence of population ageing, the accumulation of wealth occurs in 
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 An example where such conditions were often absent and therefore the economic performance lagged well 
behind that of East and South East Asia, despite having similar demographics, is Latin America during the 
period 1965-1990 (Bloom & Canning 2008). 
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anticipation of ageing. The first and second dividends may therefore also overlap as early 
policy response is essential to realizing the second dividend (Mason & Lee 2006).  
Specifically, during the first demographic dividend the growth in the effective labour 
force (L) is greater than the effective number of consumers (N), i.e. a positive support ratio 
(SR). Depending on data availability different support ratios (𝐿/𝑁) can be calculated, but 
most methods can be traced back to the publication by Cuttler et al. (1990). For instance 
Prskawetz and Sambt (2014) applied so-called National Transfer Account
22
 (NTA) age 
profiles for labour income and consumption to obtain L and N and the resulting NTA support 
ratio. In the simplest form the same weights are given to all consumers (of all ages) and all 
producers (fixed at ages 20-64) (i.e. SR1 = 𝐿1/𝑁1, which thus equals the inverse of the 
TDR). However, it is more realistic that age groups differ in labour productivity given the age 
differences in human capital, income, LFP and hours worked, and in consumption needs, 
such as in relation to private non-medical expenses, public education expenses and medical 
expenses. This leads to the following adjusted support ratio: 
𝑆𝑅2(𝑡) =
𝐿2(𝑡)
𝑁2(𝑡)
=  
∑ 𝛾(𝑎)𝑁(𝑎,𝑡)𝜔𝑎=0
∑ 𝛼(𝑎)𝑁(𝑎,𝑡)𝜔𝑎=0
 (a) 
where 𝑁(𝑎, 𝑡) represents the number of people aged 𝑎 in year 𝑡; 𝛾(𝑎) represents an age-
specific, time-invariant vector of productivity that is based on the NTA age profile of labour 
income scaled by the unweighted average of labour income between 30-49 years of age
23
. 
Similarly, 𝛼(𝑎) represents an age-specific, time-invariant vector of consumption that is based 
on the NTA profile of consumption, scaled again by the unweighted average of labour 
income between ages 30 and 49. Finally, 𝜔 denotes the maximum length of life (Prskawetz & 
Sambt 2014).  
The first demographic dividend is then represented by the growth rate (denoted by 
‘   ̂’) of the SR. If positive, i.e. when the effective number of producers is growing faster than 
the effective number of consumers, a dividend is obtained
24
: 
𝑆𝑅2(𝑡)̂ = 𝐿2(𝑡)̂ − 𝑁2(𝑡)̂ = 𝐿?̂? (18) 
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 Motivated by the economic life cycle, National Transfer Accounts provides a systematic and comprehensive 
approach to measuring the economic flows from a generational perspective. Given that at the beginning and end 
of our lives we consume more than we produce through our labour and during the mid-part of our lives it is the 
other way around, in the context of population ageing, changes in population age structure influence saving and 
the demand for wealth and capital, such as the demand for old-age support. Specifically, NTA provide an 
accounting of economic flows to and from residents of a country classified by their age. The accounts are 
comprehensive in that all economic flows that arise as a consequence of the production of goods and services 
during the year are incorporated into the accounts as well as age reallocations realized by relying on 
intergenerational transfers and assets. It is therefore a new tool that can be used to gain greater insights about 
how standard of living, generational equity, financial conditions and other important features of our economies 
are likely to be influenced by these demographic changes (UN 2013a).  
23
 Normalising on the per capita labour income of persons aged 30-49 is a standard approach in NTA analyses 
for comparing the results across countries (see Prskawetz & Sambt (2014) and Mason & Lee (2011)). 
24
 However, Crespo Cuaresma (2014b) found that not the higher proportion of workers but improvements in 
educational attainment are key to explaining productivity and income growth, i.e. a substantial portion of the 
demographic dividend is an education dividend. It is also important to note that changes in the SR ignore 
changes in unemployment and labour force participation rates, which are kept constant in the NTA profile as 
they are computed per person for the base year only (Patxot et al. 2011). 
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According to a study by Mason and Lee (2006) the world as a whole and most major 
regions experienced a favourable first demographic dividend between 1960 and 2000 (an 
exception being the least developed countries located primarily in Africa). Particularly some 
of the high performing countries of East Asia enjoyed a very favourable dividend as the 
effective labour growth outgrew the rate of increase in effective consumers. However, both 
there as in Europe (though not Northern America) population ageing is likely to cause a 
negative first dividend over the coming decades (Table 3). In the world’s most aged countries 
such as Spain this is already taking place (Figure 5). 
 
Table 3. First demographic dividend, 1960-2050. Major regions of the world. 
 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1960-2000 
First 
divided 
(%) 
1960-
2000 
Annual growth rate (%) 
2000-2050 
First 
dividend 
(%) 
2000-
2050 
Cumulated first divi-
dend since 1960 (%) 
 
Effective 
labour force 
Effective 
consumers 
Effective 
labour force 
Effective 
consumers 
2000 2050 
         
WORLD 1.99 1.80 0.19 0.89 0.71 0.18 7.7 16.0 
More developed regions  0.90 0.71 0.18 -0.56 -0.27 -0.29 7.6 -4.3 
Less developed regions 2.42 2.17 0.25 1.19 0.91 0.29 10.3 23.7 
Least developed countries 2.42 2.51 -0.09 2.95 2.27 0.67 -3.5 26.2 
         
Northern America 1.40 1.14 0.25 0.36 0.55 -0.19 10.6 2.5 
Europe 0.65 0.51 0.14 -1.00 -0.69 -0.32 5.8 -6.9 
Oceania 1.90 1.72 0.18 0.89 0.86 0.03 7.4 8.5 
Asia 2.30 2.01 0.29 0.77 0.58 0.19 12.3 21.2 
Latin America 2.62 2.27 0.35 0.91 0.65 0.26 15.0 27.5 
Africa 2.60 2.66 -0.06 2.74 2.03 0.71 -2.2 29.8 
         
China 2.27 1.78 0.49 -0.23 -0.06 -0.18 21.5 13.2 
Republic of Korea 2.49 1.74 0.74 -0.49 -0.04 -0.45 34.7 12.5 
         
 
Source: Mason and Lee (2006).  
 
Figure 5. First demographic dividend, 1950-2050. Spain. 
 
Source: adapted from Patxot et al. (2011). 
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On the other hand, longer life and changes in the population age structure can lead to more 
rapid accumulation of assets and thereby produce a second demographic divided. However, 
for this to take place current per capita consumption needs to rise by less than the support 
ratio as saving rates as well as assets will increase. This then leads to an increase in labour 
productivity and wages and in the long run a sustained higher level of consumption. 
Specifically, the second demographic dividend can be formally derived starting from the 
following decomposition of consumption per capita (Mason & Lee 2007): 
𝐶(𝑡)
𝑁(𝑡)
=  
𝐶(𝑡)
𝑌(𝑡)
∙
𝑌(𝑡)
𝐿(𝑡)
∙
𝐿(𝑡)
𝑁(𝑡)
 (b) 
where 𝐶(𝑡) denotes total consumption and 𝑌(𝑡) is total labour income. Note that 𝐿(𝑡) = 𝐿2 
and 𝑁(𝑡) = 𝑁2 from equation (a) with 𝐿(𝑡)/𝑁(𝑡) equalling the SR. The term 𝐶(𝑡)/𝑁(𝑡) is 
denoted as consumption index 𝑐̅(𝑡), while 𝑌(𝑡)/𝐿(𝑡) is considered the labour market index 
?̅?(𝑡). If the first two product terms on the right hand side of (18) were not affected by 
demographic change, a change in the support ratio would translate into a proportional change 
of consumption per capita. However, as was argued in Mason and Lee (2007), a change in the 
age structure of a population will also affect the consumption per output level (𝐶/𝑌). If 𝐶/𝑌 
decreases when the SR increases, savings will increase. Following Prskawetz and Sambt 
(2014) by rearranging equation (b), writing it in growth terms and using subscripts to denote 
the numerator of the variable under consideration, one obtains the rate of growth of 
consumption relative to income ?̂?𝑌, i.e. the second demographic dividend: 
?̂?𝑌 = (?̂?𝑁 − ?̂?𝐿) − ?̂?𝑁 (19) 
The growth rate of 𝐿𝑁 equals the first demographic dividend, while the term in brackets gives 
the “extent to which consumption per consumer 𝐶𝑁 rises relative to productivity changes 𝑌𝐿 
induced by technological innovation” (Mason & Lee 2007). However, the second dividend is 
more complex to estimate than the first. This is partly because the accumulation of wealth is 
intrinsically forward looking as individuals accumulate wealth in anticipation of future needs 
to support consumption, to finance bequests, and to respond to other uncertain events. In 
other words, current generations must first reduce their consumption in order to increase their 
wealth and achieve higher consumption in future periods. This therefore means that 
projections of the equivalent number of consumers and producers for each cohort and 
complete life cycle wealth estimates for many decades in advance are required; and while 
population projections are often uncertain, life cycle wealth data are often not available. 
Fortunately, the nature of the economic lifecycle provides assistance with this problem as for 
the most part, capital accumulation is concentrated among older working-age adults who are 
approaching their peak earnings and have completed their childrearing responsibilities, 
reason why it is recommended to use wealth held by those age 50 and older to measure the 
effect of demography on aggregate lifecycle wealth and the second demographic dividend 
(Mason 2005). Given this age-profile, each can be considered as ageing indicators. 
Specifically, aggregate lifecycle wealth, 𝑊(𝑡) is the wealth that adults must hold, as a 
group in year 𝑡 in order to achieve a given path of consumption and labour over the 
remainder of their collective existence. 𝑊(𝑡) is equal to the present value, 𝑃𝑉, of the 
consumption less the 𝑃𝑉 of the labour income of those over the remainder of their lives, i.e. 
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𝑊(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑊(𝑎, 𝑡) = ∑(𝑃𝑉[𝐶(𝑎, 𝑡)] − 𝑃𝑉[𝑌(𝑎, 𝑡)]) (20) 
where 𝐶(𝑎, 𝑡) and 𝑌(𝑎, 𝑡) are vectors of current and future consumption and current and 
future labour income, respectively, for the cohort of age 𝑎 and year 𝑡. Summing 𝑊(𝑎, 𝑡) 
across all adult ages in year 𝑡 yields aggregate lifecycle wealth, 𝑊(𝑡) (Mason & Lee 2007). 
This wealth can take different forms. One possibility is that retirees will rely on 
transfers from public pension and welfare programmes 𝑇𝑝(𝑡) or from adult children 𝑇𝑘(𝑡) 
and other family members. In this case, individuals are accumulating transfer wealth as a 
method of financing consumption during their retirement years. A second possibility is that 
individuals will accumulate assets and capital 𝐴(𝑡) such as private savings and funded 
pensions during their working years and that this capital will serve as the source of support 
during the retirement period. Both of these forms of wealth can be used to deal with the life 
cycle deficit at older ages. The second demographic dividend thus depends on (a) the share of 
family transfers to children 𝜏𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑇𝑘(𝑡)/𝑊(𝑡) and (b) on how much of the old age 
consumption is supported by transfers as opposed to assets 𝜏(𝑡) =
𝑇𝑃(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)+𝑇𝑃(𝑡)
 (where 𝐴(𝑡) +
𝑇𝑃(𝑡) is denoted as pension wealth). The higher the share of family transfers to children (as 
opposed to public transfers) the more wealth is required from people for financing 
consumption of their children. Analogously, if elderly finance a large share of their 
consumption through asset based reallocation, people need to accumulate more wealth during 
their active life for the time of retirement (Prskawetz & Sambt 2014). Likewise, for the 
macroeconomy it is important whether that wealth is created by expanding transfer programs 
or accumulating assets because only in the latter case will savings and capital deepening 
increase (Mason & Lee 2007). 
Mason (2005) estimated first and second dividends over the last three decades of last 
century and compared it with the growth in GDP per capita (Table 4). He found that the 
second demographic dividend was already larger than the first in all major world regions, but 
that only in industrial countries, East Asia & Southeast Asia and South Asia the two 
dividends combined were less than the total growth in GDP per capita. However, while 
changes in the age composition accounted for an important part of the rapid growth in East 
and Southeast Asia, other regions such as Latin America did not successfully exploit their 
demographic dividends as actual growth fell well short of that opportunity, although in Africa 
the dividend period is just beginning. 
It is, however, important for ageing societies to know that the way a society supports 
its elderly determines how much of the second demographic dividend is realised, while 
combining the two demographic dividends could be used as an indicator of ageing. For 
instance, a positive total dividend is not anticipated in most European countries over the 
coming decades because the consumption of the elderly is predominantly financed through 
familial and public transfers rather than assets. If transfer wealth dominates the age 
reallocation system for supporting the elderly it would mean that no second demographic 
dividend is yielded (Mason & Lee 2006). This is because an increase in transfer wealth will 
crowd out the stock of capital and hence future economic growth and per capita income will 
decline. 
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Table 4. Estimates of the first and second dividends and the actual growth in Gross 
Domestic Product per effective consumer (GDP/N). 1970-2000. 
 Demographic Dividends Actual 
growth in 
GDP/N 
GDP growth-
Dividend 
 
First Second Total 
      
Industrial 0.34 0.69 1.03 2.25 1.22 
East Asia & Southeast Asia 0.59 1.31 1.90 4.32 2.42 
South Asia 0.10 0.69 0.80 1.88 1.08 
Latin America 0.62 1.08 1.70 0.94 -0.76 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.09 0.17 0.08 0.06 -0.02 
Middle East and North Africa 0.51 0.70 1.21 1.10 -0.11 
Transitional 0.24 0.57 0.81 0.61 0.20 
Pacific Islands 0.58 1.15 1.73 0.93 -0.79 
      
 
Source: Mason (2005) 
 
To conclude, Table 5 provides an overview of the alternative ageing indicators that have been 
discussed in the paper, including the direction of estimated short-term future trends. 
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Table 5. Inventory of indicators of population ageing as alternative to the Old Age Dependency Ratio (OADR) 
# Abbrev. Full name of indicator Measured as Short-term Main reference 
    Prediction* 
 
The standard 
0 OADR Old Age Dependency Ratio 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100 ↑ e.g. UN 2013b 
Years left vs. years lived 
1. Prop RLE15- Proportion of pop in age groups with RLE15- 
∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 100 ↑ but < OADR Sanderson & Scherbov 2007b 
2. POADR Prospective Old Age Dependency Ratio 
∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ ∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
∗ 100 ↑ but < OADR Sanderson & Scherbov 2007b 
3. POADR5TTD Health care need adjusted POADR 
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15− & 𝑇𝑇𝐷<5
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ ∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
∗ 100 Slight ↑ Spijker et al. 2014 
Non-working to working population ratios 
4. PWR  Pensioner/Worker Ratio 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 ↑ ≈ OADR Bongaarts 2004 
5. R Ratio Nonworkers to Workers 
𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 1+ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘
 ↑ 2005-25 Vaupel & Loichinger 2006 
6. NWDR Non-Working Aged Dependency Ratio 
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 60+
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠
 ↑ ≈ OADR Tyers & Shi 2007 
Years left-based elderly dependency ratios with alternative denominators 
7. REDR Real Elderly Dependency Ratio 
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100 Slight ↓ Spijker & MacInnes 2013b  
8. RLE15/gdp Elderly to GDP Ratio 
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝐾 $ 
∗ 1,000,000      Constant Spijker et al. 2014 
9. RLE15/tax Elderly to Tax Ratio 
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−
𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝐾 $
∗ 1,000,000      Constant Spijker et al. 2014 
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Old age vs. ill-health dependency ratios 
10. ALE/LE Ratio Active (disability free) LE to total LE 
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑥
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑥
∗ 100 ↑ Manton et al. 2006 
11. ADDR Adult Disability Dependency Ratio 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
∗ 100 Constant Sanderson & Scherbov 2010 
12. HODR Healthy Old-age Dependency Ratio 
𝑁𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦,65+
𝑁15−64
 ↑ Muszyńska & Rau 2012 
13. UnHODR Unhealthy Old-age Dependency Ratio 
𝑁𝑈𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦,65+
𝑁15−64
 Slight ↑ Muszyńska & Rau 2012 
14. RADDR Real Adult Disability Dependency Ratio 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20+𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100 N/A New 
15. REDDR Real Elderly Disability Dependency Ratio 
∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝐿𝐸15−𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100 N/A New 
16. REDR5TTD Health care need adjusted REDR 
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝐿𝐸15− & 𝑇𝑇𝐷<5
# 𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100  Slight ↑ Spijker et al. 2014 
Human capital-based elderly dependency ratio 
17. HC-OADR Human capital OADR 
𝑝𝑜𝑝.65+ 𝑎𝑑𝑗.𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 20−64 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
 ↑ Philipov et al. 2014 
Consumption vs. production ratios and lifetime wealth 
18 ?̂?𝑁 First Demographic Dividend = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛̂ − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑠̂  ↓ Mason & Lee 2007 
19 ?̂?𝑌 Second Demographic Dividend (
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛̂
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠̂
−
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒̂
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑠̂  
) −
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛̂
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑠̂
 ↑ Mason & Lee 2007 
20 𝑊(𝑡) Aggregate Lifecycle Wealth ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑤−𝑎0(𝑡)
𝑥=0 − ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑤−𝑎0(𝑡)
𝑥=0  ** ↑ Mason & Lee 2007 
 
* For most low-mortality countries. If possible, comparison in projected trend with other indicator. 
** The formula is here simplified. For a full account of how life cycle wealth can be estimated, see Mason and Lee (2007). 
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3. Discussion 
Old-age survival has been improving virtually without interruption over the last half century 
in high income countries. Yet we continue to measure elderly in the same static manner today 
as 50 years ago, despite the diverse employment histories, social responsibilities, financial 
circumstances and health statuses. Sixty-five is often taken as the demarcation line between 
mature adulthood and old age, largely due to the fact that for many years it has been, or was 
until recently, the statutory retirement age. However, a contested conjecture is if 65-year-olds 
today are really as old as 65-year olds in 1965, or even in 2000, even if they lived the same 
number of years (Lutz et al. 2008c). This conjecture is fundamental because we live in an era 
where most people in low-mortality countries are expected to survive beyond 80 years of age 
while concomitantly current retirees stop working (well) before the pension eligibility age. 
Over the last few decades this has raised issues regarding the affordability of old-age social 
security benefits and medical, health and personal care. Today, this concern is becoming even 
more urgent as baby boomers are starting to retire and smaller birth cohorts are making up a 
larger part of the current, and more importantly, future workforce as fertility rates have been 
just or well below replacement in most Western countries for 3-4 decades. On the other hand, 
there are with regard to the workforce also two counter-trends: in many countries 
proportionally more women are in paid employment today than ever before while there are 
also signs that the LFP rate of older workers is increasing. 
Not surprisingly, while some concerns regarding the impact that population ageing 
will have on society are justified, much of the rhetoric is based on the use of elderly 
dependency ratios such as the OADR that do not consider changing old-age survival rates, 
labour force participation rates or consumption and savings patterns. As a result, over the last 
10 years or so, particularly demographers have looked at developing alternative indicators of 
population ageing. Perhaps the most important conclusion deriving from this inventory is that 
the indicator to use depends on the purpose of the exercise.  
While this may appear to be obvious, the OADR or the proportion of the total 
population aged 60+ or 65+ is still used as the basis for arguments concerning the supposed 
negative effects of population ageing and even for policy changes. I have therefore grouped 
the alternative indicators that were discussed in this paper into five types: 
1. Purely demographic 
2. Purely economic 
3. Demographic and economic related 
4. Health and disability related 
5. Based on human capital 
This paper has shown that the best way to investigate the possible effects of 
population ageing on economic variables such as consumption, savings and productivity or 
the affordability of the public pension system types 2, 3 or 5 indicators should be used. If, on 
the other hand, one aims to study changes in elderly health and disability in the context of the 
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sustainability of the public health care system then types 1 and 4 are the most obvious ones to 
choose from. 
What population ageing means for future economic growth and public finances have 
been of particular interest for academics. Recent literature has developed theoretical 
arguments that focus on the different channels through which demography may inﬂuence 
economic growth, as well as empirical evidence on the potential effects of such demographic 
changes on several macroeconomic variables (Crespo Cuaresma et al. 2014a). This has been 
aided by the creation of the National Transfer Accounts that has enabled a more precise 
construction of population ageing indicators by taking into consideration the effect of changes 
in the population age structure on income and consumption flows. One result of NTA is for 
instance that population ageing also depresses the support ratio after adjusting for age-specific 
consumption and labour income profiles and is likely to produce a negative first demographic 
dividend in most industrialised countries over the coming decades (Prskawetz & Sambt 
2014). The resulting increasing proportion of non-working elderly in the population is, as we 
know, a common political and economic worry because it is thought that the burden for 
working adults of financing the consumption of non-working adults through public transfers 
will increase to unsustainable levels (e.g. European Commission 2010). However, detailed 
age accounting for individuals and households using NTA data has also shown that basing 
policy solely on expected changes in the support ratio is ignoring an array of other factors 
that, under the right circumstances, may actually produce a second demographic dividend in 
ageing populations. This is for several reasons. First, because retirees do not, as popular 
discourse may suggest, rely exclusively on the labour of others (through public and familial 
transfer systems) to fund their pensions but also on their own pension funds, personal savings, 
homes acquired during their working years, and other assets to finance some part of their 
retirement (Mason & Lee 2007). Secondly, during the process of population ageing the labour 
force increasingly concentrates in higher age groups. As they are generally aware of their own 
mortality risk (Hamermesh 1985; Post & Hanewald 2012) they know that they will spend 
more years in retirement than earlier cohorts. This can be a strong incentive for people to 
accumulate assets for their retirement, which then leads to an upward shift in the age profile 
of wealth, an important source of the second demographic dividend. 
However, when consumption of the elderly is mainly financed by the state through public 
transfers (e.g. state pensions), as in many European countries, a positive second demographic 
dividend may be harder to achieve. Economic and policy responses to population ageing and 
population decline therefore holds the key to continued economic growth for many countries, 
but this will not be an easy task as many issues will need to be considered. According to Clark 
et al. (2007) such include whether: 
 governments should be concerned about economic growth or only focus on per capita 
income and consumption; 
 taxes will need to be raised, benefits cut, retirement ages raised for the financing of 
national retirement systems and if governments can make the transition from current pay-
as-you-go plans to funded plans; 
 policies should be adopted to curtail rapid growth in health care spending; 
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 there was a first demographic dividend (due to declines in child dependency) and if a 
country can produce a second demographic dividend (save now to increase production in 
the future); 
 LFP rates can be increased to maintain the size of the labour force (e.g. by facilitating 
women to enter the workforce, relaxing immigration standards, keeping older workers in 
the workforce). 
These issues make it clear that elderly dependency or support ratios are required that don’t 
merely compare a supposed dependent population defined by a fixed age (usually aged 65+) 
with everyone of working age as such are misleading because they do not take other 
important factors into consideration. Depending on the context, the picture of population 
ageing may be quite different than that is often suggested on the basis of the OADR. For 
instance, the population ageing that many populations will experience over the coming 
decades shifts the demand for wealth and capital to the right, leading to increased capital per 
worker, and therefore higher, not lower productivity, while consumption is also higher in the 
long term. Likewise, focussing on public pensions also gives a mistaken sense of the 
consequences of rising old-age dependency as they only cost a small fraction of national 
output. Support ratios that take into consideration age-specific consumption and production 
patterns are therefore much more realistic than the standard OADR (Lee & Mason 2010).  
Moreover, the supposed “dependency burden” of the elderly is a function of the 
institutional welfare system that is in place rather than an elderly to worker ratio. For instance, 
if the only reason to raise the pension age are budgetary considerations that cannot cover an 
increasing proportion of elderly it is unclear why alternative expenditure reductions or 
revenue increases are not equally satisfactory. As Scherbov et al. (2014) state, a better 
rationale for raising pension ages is that pensioners are living longer so it would be unfair for 
younger generations to have to pay for the older generations’ longevity gains. Older 
generations enjoying those gains should therefore help to keep public pensions affordable by 
increasing their LFP during their working life and/or retiring later
25
. 
Although dealing with the issues raised by Clark et al. (2007) is obviously beyond scope of 
this paper, the use of adequate population ageing measures would absolutely facilitate 
estimating the supposed “dependency burdens” for different types of population ageing 
issues. For instance, in terms of health care this paper introduced several indicators that 
approximated the dependent population by according to a particular characteristic other than 
simply taking the entire 65+ population. One was to consider the proportion of the population 
with an average life expectancy of 15 years or less (RLE15-) as the numerator with the 
argument that elderly of a particular age generally have higher remaining life expectancies 
and are healthier than their counterparts in earlier generations (Sanderson & Scherbov 2013) 
and with similar differences between low and high mortality countries. This way, a more 
comparable elderly population in terms of health needs is obtained. It formed the basis for 
                                                 
25
 According to estimates made by Scherbov et al. (2014), in most European countries an increase in normal 
pension age to 68 by 2050 would not be enough to keep the burden on the working population from ballooning 
and may require the pension age to be increased to 70 years, unless LFP increases by several percentage points. 
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Sanderson and Scherbov’s (2007b) Prospective Old Age Dependency Ratio, while Spijker 
and MacInnes (2013b) subsequently adjusted the denominator with the argument that the bulk 
of health care is paid by those in paid employment. However, further refinements can still be 
made because health care costs are more related to factors such as progress in medical 
knowledge and technology, hospitalization costs and more use of long-term care facilities 
rather than population ageing, costs that are particularly high during the last few years rather 
than the last 15 years of a person’s life (see section 2.1 for references). Sanderson and 
Scherbov’s RLE15- definition of elderly is a good way to define the older population, but 
those who form part of the population who actually require health care is only a subset of this 
population. The “Health care need adjusted Real Elderly Dependency Ratio” (i.e. considering 
within this population those elderly who are expected to die within 5 years) was one attempt 
to adjust this further. 
To conclude, population ageing is the result of changes in the age distribution that has led 
to proportionally more elderly in the population. Due to the widespread use of inadequate 
population ageing indicators such as the OADR this phenomenon is often seen as a threat to 
economic growth and government budgets spending even though many other factors are 
involved in the observed and projected increases in health care and social benefit spending or 
economic production. Indeed, an ageing population even has the potential for economic 
growth with the right policies in place. However, a more widespread use of more precise 
population ageing indicators is still required in order to get the general public, policy makers 
and even some academics to also understand this. 
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